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Marteck Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc.: 
Flipping the Lexiographer Rule on its Head 
In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc.,1 the Federal Circuit 
considered whether the claim term “animal” included humans where the patent 
specification provides a single sentence definition for the claim term.2 The Martek 
court held that the term “animal” included humans because the specification 
contained a sentence that gave the term the broader construction of any Animalia 
organism rather than that of its ordinary meaning and the rest of the specification 
did not reveal the patentee’s clear intent to renounce such broad scope.3 In so 
holding, the Martek court ruled that when a patentee explicitly assigns a special 
meaning to a claim term anywhere in the specification, the new meaning controls 
unless the specification reveals that the patentee unmistakably rejects that 
definition.4 As such, the majority created a new rule that effectively turns the 
established lexicographer rule—that the specification must reveal the patentee’s 
clear intent to override the term’s ordinary meaning—on its head.5 If the majority 
had followed precedent, it would have found that Martek did not satisfy the 
lexicographer rule, and thus, held that Martek’s purported definition did not 
override the plain meaning of the term “animal,” which did not include humans.6 
By announcing its new rule, the court conceivably modified the legal scope of 
patents drafted in reliance on the established lexicographer rule—either 
inconsistently broadening or narrowing such scope.7 
 
 
© 2011 Ngai Zhang.  
 * J.D. 2011, University of Maryland School of Law. 
 1.  579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 2.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1379–80. “Claim term” may refer to words or phrases in the claims section of the 
patent specification. In patent law, a bedrock principle is “that the claims of a patent define the invention to 
which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 
381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 3.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1380. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 6.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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I. The Case 
Docosahexaenoic acid (“DHA”) is an essential omega-3 fatty acid necessary for the 
development of organs such as the heart, brain, and eyes.8 Because the human body 
produces DHA only in limited quantities, a diet with supplemental DHA is 
desirable.9 
Martek Biosciences Corp. (“Martek”) and Nutrinova, Inc., Nutrinova Nutrition 
Specialties and Food Ingredients GmbH, and Lonza, Ltd. (collectively “Lonza”) 
make and sell DHA products.10 The DHA is obtained by extracting lipids from 
fermented microorganisms.11 The patents at issue relate to specified 
microorganisms that are useful for the commercial production of DHA because 
they produce high levels of DHA.12 One of the patents at issue was Martek’s U.S. 
Patent No. 5,698,244 (“‘244 patent”), which is directed to methods for increasing 
the concentration of omega-3 highly unsaturated fatty acids (HUFA) in animals by 
feeding them the specified microorganisms.13 
Before the district court, Martek alleged that Lonza infringed several patents, 
including the ‘244 patent.14 In a Markman hearing,15 the district court held that the 
claim term “animal” meant “any member of the kingdom Animalia, except 
humans.”16 Based on the claim construction, Martek stipulated that Lonza did not 
infringe the ‘244 patent because Lonza only used the alleged infringed methods to 
provide omega HUFA to humans.17 However, Martek preserved its right to appeal 
the court’s construction of the term “animal.”18 At trial, the jury found for Martek 
on all the other alleged claims.19 Lonza appealed, and Martek cross-appealed.20 With 
 
 8.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1367. Moreover, omega-3 fatty acids have been recognized to have many 
additional health benefits, which include preventing arteriosclerosis and coronary heart disease, alleviating 
inflammatory conditions, and retarding tumor growth. U.S. Patent No. 5,698,244 col.1 ll.27–32 (filed June 7, 
1995) (“‘244 Patent”). 
 9.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1367. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 1367–68. 
 15.  A Markman hearing is a pretrial hearing where a judge determines the appropriate meanings of 
relevant key terms in a patent claim. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) 
(holding that claim construction is a matter of law “exclusively within the province of the court”). 
 16.  Order Construing the Terms of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,340,594; 5,698,244; 6,410,281; 6,451,567; and 
6,607,900 at 1, Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., No. 03-896, 2005 WL 6220494 (D.Del. Dec. 12, 
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 17.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1379. 
 18.  Id. at 1368. 
 19.  Id. Both parties filed post-trial motions. Lonza moved for JMOL on some of the patent claims, and 
Martek moved for a permanent injunction. The district court granted Lonza’s motion for JMOL on one of the 
patent claims and Martek’s motion for a permanent injunction. Id. 
 20.  Id. 
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respect to the ‘244 patent, Martek appealed the district court’s claim construction in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the 
construction was erroneous.21 
II. Legal Background 
In determining the meaning of claim terms, a patentee has the right to be his own 
lexicographer—to define the language used in his patent.22 The language in the 
patent claims defines the invention to which the patentee has the right to exclude.23 
Thus, in interpreting a patentee’s invention, the focus “must begin and remain 
centered on the claim language itself, for that is the language the patentee has 
chosen to particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject matter which 
the patentee regards as his invention.”24 But because claims are part of a fully 
integrated written instrument, consisting primarily of a specification that concludes 
with the claims, the claim language must be read in light of the specification in its 
entirety.25 As the Federal Circuit has stated, the specification “is always highly 
relevant to the claim construction analysis . . . ; it is the single best guide to the 
meaning of a disputed term.”26 
A. Unless the Patentee Clearly Intended to Assign a Unique Definition to a Claim 
Term, the Term Takes on its Ordinary Meaning. 
A claim term takes on the meaning commonly attributed to it by those in the 
relevant fields unless it is clear in light of the entire specification that the patentee 
intended to deviate from the term’s ordinary meaning.27 In Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
the Federal Circuit reiterated the rule that a patentee is free to act as his own 
lexicographer, but only if he clearly defines the terms in the overall specification of 
 
 21.  Id. at 1379–80. 
 22.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 23.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. 
 24.  Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 25.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)). 
 26.  Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 
 27.  Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the phrase “partially hidden from view” meant hidden from view to some extent, but not totally hidden from 
view because the specification did not express a clear modification to the ordinary meaning of the term 
“partially”); Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Int’l., Inc., 423 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that 
“a” or “an” carried the ordinary meaning of “one or more” in open-ended claims containing the transitional 
phrase “comprising” and that such “convention is overcome only . . . when the patentee evinces a clear intent 
to . . . limit the article”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra notes 28–38 and accompanying text. 
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the patent.28 In doing so, the court held that the ordinary and accustomed meaning 
of the claim term “baffles”—load-bearing objects that check, impede, or obstruct 
flow—governed.29 The court explained that the generic, dictionary definition of the 
term “baffles” in claim 1 of the patent referred to objects that served to check, 
impede, or obstruct the flow of something.30 The court then stated that the 
specification did not clearly indicate that the patentee intended to depart from the 
accustomed meaning of the term.31 
In support of its assertion, the court noted that claim 2, a claim that was 
dependent32 on claim 1, included a limitation that the “baffles” are “oriented with 
the panel sections disposed at angles . . . ,” which suggested that the patentee did 
not contemplate that the term “baffles” already contained that limitation in claim 
1.33 Moreover, the court pointed to other claims that provided additional 
requirements for the “baffles” such as dependent claim 6, which stated that “the 
internal baffles of both outer panel sections overlap and interlock at angles 
providing deflector panels extending from one end of the module to the other.”34 
The court explained that if the “baffles” mentioned in claim 1 “were inherently 
placed at specific angles, or interlocked to form an intermediate barrier, claim 6 
would be redundant.”35 
In addition, the Phillips court stated that the fact that the specification provided 
descriptions of embodiments that were disposed at such angles to deflect projectiles 
was not enough to narrow the scope of the claims.36 It explained that while the 
embodiments made clear that the invention envisioned baffles that served the 
projectile-deflecting function, the examples did not imply that the “baffles” must 
serve the deflecting function in all the embodiments covered by the claims.37 Thus, 
the court concluded that the term “baffles” took on its ordinary and customary 
meaning, and was not restricted to non-perpendicular, projectile-deflecting 
structures.38 
Accordingly, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) requires 
that claim terms “conform to the invention as set forth in the remainder of the 
specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support 
 
 28.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. 
 29.  Id. at 1327. 
 30.  Id. at 1324. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  A dependent claim is a claim that adopts the language and limitations of a single or multiple claims. 
 33.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34.  Id. at 1325 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 1327. 
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or antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims 
may be ascertainable by reference to the description . . . .”39 Thus, to overcome an 
ordinary meaning presumption for terms in the claims, the specification, when 
viewed in its entirety, must make clear the patentee’s intent to replace the 
customary meaning with his own classification of the claim terms.40 
B. Claim Construction Cases in the Federal Circuit Have Demonstrated Factors that 
May Be Used to Assist Courts in Construing Claims. 
Although there is no magic formula for claim construction, there are some factors 
that can be used to assist a person of ordinary skill in the art in determining what 
the patentee had in mind when he used a claim term.41 Often, a patentee will 
provide preferred embodiments—examples of how to practice the invention in a 
particular case—to teach a person of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use 
the invention.42 Upon reading the specification in that context, it may become clear 
“whether the patentee is setting out specific examples of the invention to 
accomplish those goals, or whether the patentee instead intends for the claims and 
the embodiments in the specification to be strictly coextensive.”43 In addition, the 
location of particular limiting statements or the way the patentee uses a term within 
the specification and claims may also make the scope of the claim apparent.44 
Furthermore, a court may employ other factors to assist itself in construing a claim 
term.45 
 
 
C. Similarities Between the Disputed Claims and the Embodiments May Indicate that 
the Patentee Intended the Two to be Strictly Coextensive. 
 
 39.  Id. at 1316–17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40. Helmsderfer, 527 F.3d at 1381 (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316); see also Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (stating that “a term can be defined only in a way that comports with the 
instrument as a whole”). 
 41.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323–24. 
 42.  Id. at 1323. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. (“The manner in which the patentee uses a term within the specification and claims usually will 
make the distinction apparent.”).  
 45.  See id. at 1324 (noting that there is no magic formula for claim construction). 
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Typically, particular embodiments appearing in the specification “will not be used 
to limit claim language that has broader effect.”46 In Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. 
Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., the parties disputed over the coverage of the 
claim language, “said tube operatively connected to said cap . . . .”47 One of the 
arguments made by the alleged infringer was that the embodiment illustrated in the 
figures and written description showed “not merely adjoining or abutting, but 
affixing the tube to the cap by some tenacious means of physical engagement that 
results in a unitary structure.”48 The Federal Circuit first determined that the 
ordinary and customary meaning of “operatively connected” in the disputed claim 
required the “linking together of the tube and the cap to produce the intended or 
proper effect.”49 After making that determination, the court concluded that the 
embodiment in the specification was merely one example of the invention, and 
thus, did not limit the ordinary meaning of the claim term “operatively 
connected.”50 It stated that even “where an applicant describes only a single 
embodiment,” the law does not require a court “to construe the claims as limited to 
that one embodiment.”51 The court then explained that unless there was a clear 
disavowal of the claim scope, the term “operatively connected” took on the full 
breadth of its plain meaning.52 
However, even though a claim term is not limited merely because the 
embodiments in the specification all contain a specific feature, a patentee’s choice 
of embodiments can help clarify the intended scope of the claim.53 For example, in 
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., the Federal Circuit recognized that similarities 
between the disputed claim language and the preferred embodiments can imply 
that they were intended to be conterminous.54 The court noted that the claim 
language at issue was essentially equivalent to many of the preferred embodiments.55 
The only significant difference between the disputed claim and the preferred 
embodiments was an explicit description of the pleating.56 Thus, the court 
 
 46.  Innova/Purewater, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 47.  Id. at 1122 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48.  Id. at 1121 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49.  Id. at 1118 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50.  Id. at 1122. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 1117, 1122. 
 53.  C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Snow v. Lake Shore & 
M.S. Ry. Co., 121 U.S. 617, 630 (1887) (noting that there was “nothing in the context to indicate that the 
patentee contemplated any alternative” embodiment to the one presented). 
 54.  C.R. Bard, 388 F.3d at 866. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
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concluded that the preferred embodiments at least indicated that the claimed 
“implant” or “plug” required a pleated surface.57 
D. References to Claim Limitations as the Invention May Be Construed to Restrict the 
Scope of the Claims. 
In Honeywell International, Inc. v. ITT Industries, Inc.,58 the Federal Circuit utilized 
references to the invention to determine that the scope of the claim term “fuel 
injection system component” was limited to a fuel filter.59 The court stated that a 
fuel filter was not simply discussed as a preferred embodiment of the claimed 
invention, but rather as the claimed invention.60 The court then explained that on at 
least four occasions, the specification referred “to the fuel filter as ‘this invention’ or 
‘the present invention’ . . . .”61 The numerous references to the fuel filter as the 
invention allowed the court to conclude that the patentee intended the “fuel 
injection system component” to encompass a fuel filter.62 Similarly, in Edwards 
Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc.,63 the court noted that “when the preferred 
embodiment is described in the specification as the invention itself, the claims are 
not necessarily entitled to a scope broader than that embodiment.”64 As such, the 
Edwards Lifesciences court concluded that the specification at issue indicated intent 
to limit the invention to intraluminal devices (the preferred embodiment) by 
frequently describing an “intraluminal graft” as “the present invention” or “this 
invention.”65 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has stated that the location of a statement 
referenced as the invention may further the probability that the statement will 
support the limitation of a claim term.66 For example, the C.R. Bard court pointed 
out that statements describing the invention as a whole, rather than statements 
describing only preferred embodiments, “are more likely to support a limiting 
definition of a claim term.”67 The court then explained that statements describing 
the invention as a whole are more likely to be found in particular sections of the 
 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  452 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  582 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 64.  Id. at 1330 (quoting Chimie v. PPG Indus. Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 65.  Id. at 1330. 
 66.  C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 67.  Id. 
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specification, such as the Summary of the Invention.68 In C.R. Bard, the patent at 
issue contained a Summary of the Invention stating that “[t]he present invention is 
an implantable prosthesis and that [t]he implant includes a pleated surface . . .” [and 
an Abstract describing] “[a]n implantable prosthesis including a conical mesh plug 
having a pleated surface . . . .”69 Because the statements were in the Summary of the 
Invention and the Abstract, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claimed plug was 
defined globally as requiring a pleated surface.70 
E. Other Factors May Also Be Considered Because There is No Magic Formula for 
Claim Construction. 
As the Phillips court understood, there is no rigid algorithm for claim 
construction.71 Because a claim term must be read in light of the specification in its 
entirety, a court may use other additional factors to determine what the patentee 
had in mind at the time of filing.72 Other factors that courts have used include 
whether the patentee distinguished the scope of the claim language by using 
different terms or phrases;73 whether claim terms are interchangeably used in the 
specification;74 whether a particular interpretation would exclude the preferred 
embodiment;75 or whether a particular interpretation would deprive the claim of all 
clarity.76 
 
 
III. The Court’s Reasoning 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 860–61 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,356,432 col. 1, ll. 51–55 (filed Feb. 5, 1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 72.  See id. (explaining that there is no rigid algorithm for claim construction). 
 73.  See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 74.  See Edwards Lifesciences, 582 F.3d at 1329 (concluding that the interchangeable use of the words 
“graft” and “intraluminal graft” was akin to equating the two terms). 
 75.  See Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that the 
district court’s claim interpretation could not be sustained because the interpretation would have excluded the 
preferred embodiment described in the specification); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that an interpretation that excluded the preferred embodiment from the scope of a 
patent claim “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support”). 
 76.  See CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that a claim 
term will not be given its ordinary meaning if such meaning deprives the claim of all clarity). 
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In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., the Federal Circuit, in a 3-2 decision, 
reversed the district court’s construction of the claim term “animal” in the ‘244 
patent.77 The court held that when a patentee expressly defines a claim term 
anywhere in the patent specification, the patentee’s definition controls unless there 
is a clear disavowal of the defined term.78 Judge Garjarsa, writing for the majority, 
stated that a patentee is free to be his own lexicographer: a patentee’s definition of a 
claim term controls, regardless of the term’s ordinary meaning.79 The court 
explained that, in this case, Martek expressly defined the claim term “animal” in the 
‘244 patent: “The term ‘animal’ means any organism belonging to the kingdom 
Animalia.”80 Therefore, because there was no dispute that humans belong to the 
kingdom Animalia, the court found that Martek’s definition for the term “animal” 
controlled.81 
The court then stated that the ‘244 patent did not contain any language that 
could be reasonably interpreted as a clear intention to disclaim the coverage of 
humans from the broadly defined term “animal.”82 First, the court asserted that the 
enumeration of preferred non-human animals did not clearly restrict the generally 
defined term.83 The court explained that limitations in particular embodiments 
listed in the specification will not narrow claim language that has a broader effect 
unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to restrict the claim’s scope.84 
The court then explained that although the patent considered certain animals to be 
preferred animals from which food product is produced, it did “not state that all 
animals covered by the claims must produce a food product.”85 Second, the court 
stated that other sections of the patent did not establish an apparent intent to 
disclaim humans from the scope of the claims.86 The court explained that the use of 
generic terms such as “‘raising’ and ‘feeding’ animals” or the fact that some 
dependent claims were directed to certain types of animals did not clearly limit the 
scope of the term “animal” to non-human animals.87 Third, the court declared that 
the patent did contemplate that the invention could be applicable to humans.88 In 
 
 77.  Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 78.  Id. at 1380. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. (quoting ‘244 Patent col.5 ll.11–12) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. at 1381. 
 83.  Id. at 1380. 
 84.  Id. at 1381 (citing Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1117 
(Fed. Cir. 2004)) 
 85.  Id. at 1380–81. 
 86.  Id. at 1381. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
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support of its assertion, the court pointed to the following statements in the 
specification: 
The purified omega-3 highly unsaturated fatty acids can then be used as a 
nutritional supplement for humans, as a food additive, or for pharmaceutical 
applications. . . . [T]he whole-cell biomass can be used directly as a food additive to 
enhance the omega-3 highly unsaturated fatty acid content and nutritional value of 
processed foods for human intake or for animal feed. . . . A further aspect of the 
present invention includes introducing omega-3 HUFAs from the forgoing sources 
into humans for the treatment of various diseases.89 
Finally, the court concluded that Lonza’s assertion that the customary meaning 
of “animal” is a non-human animal was irrelevant because the patent explicitly 
included a definition for “animal” in the specification.90 Thus, the majority 
concluded that the appropriate construction for the claim term “animal” was “the 
one explicitly provided by the patentee: ‘any organism belonging to the kingdom 
Animalia,’ which include[d] humans.”91 
Judge Lourie dissented, concluding that the district court properly determined 
that the term “animal” only encompassed non-human animals.92 In reintroducing 
the principle that a patentee is free to be his own lexicographer, Judge Lourie did 
not disagree that Martek made an attempt at lexicography.93 However, Judge Lourie 
explained that a claim term must be read in light of the overall written specification 
and not merely with a single sentence when that sentence is inconsistent with the 
rest of the written description.94 
Judge Lourie explained that the only independent claim95 in the ‘244 patent is a 
“‘method of raising an animal, comprising feeding said animal material’ that 
contains omega-3 highly unsaturated fatty acids ‘in an amount effective to increase 
the content of omega-3 highly unsaturated fatty acids in said animal.’”96 He then 
explained that the specification revealed an invention that was directed at a method 
for raising non-human animals.97 Judge Lourie first pointed out that the Field of the 
Invention section of the patent stated that the “present invention concern[ed] a 
method for raising an animal having high concentrations of omega-3 highly 
unsaturated fatty acids (HUFA) and food products derived from such animals.”98 He 
 
 89.  Id. at 1381–82 (citing ‘244 Patent col.7 ll.8–11, 42–45, 51–54). 
 90.  Id. at 1382. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 1382 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 93.  Id. at 1383. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  An independent claim is a claim that does not adopt the language and limitations of other claims; it 
does not depend on other claims to define its scope. 
 96.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1383 (quoting ‘244 Patent col.9 ll.45–51). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. (quoting ‘244 Patent col.1 ll.21–24) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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then explained that food products are not derived from humans.99 Thus, he 
maintained that the invention was directed to only those animals from which food 
products can be derived.100 In addition, he pointed out that the Brief Summary of 
the Invention stated that animals “raised by the method of the present invention 
include[d] poultry, cattle, swine and seafood, which include[d] fish, shrimp, and 
shellfish.”101 Finally, he stated that although preferred embodiments in a 
specification are usually not to be read into the claims, the listing of the preferred 
“‘food animal[s]’ . . . strongly support[ed] a conclusion that the term ‘animal’ 
encompasse[d] only those animals raised for production of food and milk products, 
thereby not including humans.”102 
IV. Analysis 
In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the 
single sentence definition for the term “animal” overrode any ordinary meaning of 
the term because the patent specification did not supply a clear and unmistakable 
renunciation of the special meaning.103 In so holding, the Martek court created a 
new rule requiring the specification to demonstrate the patentee’s clear intent to 
override a single sentence definition for a claim term rather than mandating that 
the specification demonstrate the patentee’s clear intent to override that term’s 
ordinary meaning.104 If the majority had followed precedent, it would found 
Martek’s one sentence description of the term “animal” inconsistent with the rest of 
the specification, and correctly conclude that the term “animal” only encompassed 
its ordinary and customary meaning because Martek did not demonstrate the 
requisite intent to override such meaning.105 Instead, by formulating its new rule, 
the majority came to the wrong result and potentially altered the legal scope of 
patents filed prior to the Martek decision in such a way that is inconsistent with the 
previously established lexicographer rule.106 
 
 99.  Id. at 1383. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 1384 (quoting ‘244 Patent col.2 ll.19–23) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102.  Id. at 1384 (quoting ‘244 Patent col.5 ll.12–29). The section of the patent reads: 
Preferred animals from which to produce a food product include any economic food animal. More preferred 
animals include animals from which eggs, milk products, poultry meat, seafood, beef, pork or lamb is derived. 
Milk products include, for example, milk, cheese and butter. . . . Preferred animals for milk product production 
include milk-producing animal, in particular cows, sheep, goats, bison, buffalo, antelope, deer and camels. 
More preferred animals for milk production include cows, sheep and goats. 
‘244 Patent col.5 ll.12–29 (emphasis added). 
 103.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1380 (majority opinion). 
 104.  See infra Parts IV.A, C. 
 105.  See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
 106.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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A. The Martek Court Should Have First Determined the Ordinary Meaning of the 
Claim Term “Animal” and Then Applied the Lexicographer Rule Reiterated in 
Phillips. 
The Martek court mistakenly rejected extrinsic evidence in the record that 
demonstrated the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term “animal” as 
extraneous.107 In construing a patentee’s invention, the court should first begin with 
the language of the claims themselves because there is initially a presumption that 
the ordinary meanings apply to the claim terms.108 As the Phillips court stated, a 
patentee is free to assign a unique meaning to a claim term, but only if it is clear, in 
view of the specification as a whole, that he intended to diverge from the customary 
meaning of the word.109 Hence, the court should have initially determined the 
ordinary meaning of “animal.”110 After assessing the ordinary meaning, the court 
would have been able to determine whether it was necessary to decide if Martek, the 
patentee in this case, demonstrated a clear intent in the overall specification to 
assign a special meaning to the term “animal,” i.e., if the ordinary meaning of 
“animal” included humans, then the burden would have gone to Lonza, the alleged 
infringer, to show that Martek unmistakably narrowed the scope of the term to 
non-human animals.111 
However, in this case, neither Martek nor the majority contested the fact that the 
ordinary meaning of the term “animal” excluded humans.112 Instead, Martek and 
the majority relied on the single sentence in the specification: “The term ‘animal’ 
means any organism belonging to the kingdom Animalia.”113 Although it is true that 
humans belong to the kingdom Animalia, as Judge Lourie agreed in his dissent, the 
lexicographer rule is that in order for a patentee to assign a unique definition to a 
claim term, the patentee must demonstrate clearly in the specification as a whole 
that he intended to stray away from the ordinary meaning.114 If the majority would 
 
 107.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1382; see infra notes 108–115 and accompanying text. 
 108.  See supra Part II.A. 
 109.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 110.  See supra Part II.A. 
 111.  See supra Part II.A. After the Phillips court determined that the ordinary meaning of “baffles” did not 
include non-perpendicular, projectile-deflecting structures, the burden shifted to the alleged infringer to 
demonstrate that the patentee clearly deviated from the ordinary meaning. See supra notes 28–38 and 
accompanying text. 
 112.  See generally Principal and Response Brief for Plaintiff-Cross Appellant, Martek Biosciences Corp. v. 
Nutrinova, Inc., Nos. 2008-1459, 2008-1476 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 21, 2008); Reply Brief For Plaintiff-Cross 
Appellant, Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., Nos. 2008-1459, 2008-1476 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22, 2009). 
 113.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (quoting ‘244 Patent col.5 ll.11–12) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 114.  Id. at 1384; see supra Part II.A. 
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have followed the lexicographer rule, it would have determined that Martek did not 
satisfy its burden in light of the overall specification.115 
B. Claim Construction Factors Indicate that the Claim Term “Animal” Did Not 
Include Humans. 
As Judge Lourie pointed out in his dissenting opinion, there is only one sentence in 
the entire specification that actually supported the argument that the term “animal” 
should have been broadened to include humans.116 Because Martek’s purported 
definition located in a single sentence in the ‘244 Patent was inconsistent with the 
rest of the specification, Martek could not have shown that it clearly intended to 
assigned a special meaning to the term “animal.”117 In light of the specification, the 
factors used by the Federal Circuit in claim construction cases demonstrated that 
the claim term “animal” would have been construed by one of ordinary skill in the 
art as “any member of the kingdom Animalia, except humans.”118 
C. The Striking Similarities between the Language in the Only Independent Claim in 
the ‘244 Patent and One of the Embodiments Indicate that The Two Are Intended to be 
Strictly Coextensive. 
In making its determination that the embodiments could not be used to bound the 
claim term “animal” to its ordinary meaning, the Martek court applied the incorrect 
rule to the facts in the instant case.119 In Innova, the court stated that the claim 
language took on the full breadth of its ordinary meaning unless there was a clear 
and unmistakable disavowal of the claim scope.120 The Martek court, on the other 
hand, asserted that the claimed language took on the full breadth of Martek’s 
purported definition of the term “animal” unless Martek clearly indicated 
otherwise.121 The rule in Innova did not apply because Martek’s purported 
definition, which included humans, was much broader than the ordinary meaning 
of “animal,” and the dispute was not whether the ordinary meaning of the claim 
 
 115.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 116.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1383. 
 117.  See infra Parts IV.B.1–3. 
 118.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1382 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (quoting Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 
No. 03-896, 2005 WL 6220494 (D.Del. Dec. 12, 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see infra Parts 
IV.B.1–3. 
 119.  See infra notes 120–22 and accompanying text. 
 120.  See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 121.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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language should be narrowed, but instead, whether the claim language should be 
broadened to include humans.122 
Instead, the Martek court should have looked to C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical 
Corp. in deciding whether the embodiments prevented the claim language, “a 
method for raising animals . . . ,” from being broadened to include humans.123 In 
C.R. Bard, the Federal Circuit found that similarities between the claim language—
the invention being claimed by the patentee—and the embodiments could indicate 
that they were intended to be strictly coextensive.124 In applying the analysis used in 
C.R. Bard, the Martek court would have found that the language of’ claim 1—the 
only independent claim in the ‘244 Patent—was strikingly similar to one of the 
embodiments listed in the “Brief Summary of the Invention.”125 In the ‘244 Patent, 
claim 1 illustrated “[a] method of raising an animal comprising feeding said 
animal . . . Thraustochytriales, omega-3 highly unsaturated fatty acids extracted from 
Thraustochytriales . . . .”126 Similarly, the embodiment provided the following: 
[A] method of raising an animal comprising feeding the animal 
Thraustochytriales or omega-3 HUFAs extracted therefrom. Animals 
raised by the method of the present invention include poultry, cattle, swine 
and seafood, which includes fish, shrimp and shellfish. The omega-3 
HUFAs are incorporated into the flesh, eggs, and milk products. A further 
embodiment of the invention includes such products.127 
One ordinarily skilled in the art would read the embodiment itself as restricted 
to economic food animals, or animals from which food is produced from, because 
it only listed those types of animals.128 The equivalent language used to describe 
both the sole independent claim and the embodiment listed in the Brief Summary 
of the Invention indicated that their interpretable boundaries were intended to be 
similar, if not the same.129 Because economic food animals are not nearly as broad as 
all the members of the kingdom Animalia, the majority should not have extended 
the meaning of the term “animal” in the claims beyond the scope of its ordinary 
meaning.130 
 
 122.  See supra notes 47–52, 78 and accompanying text. 
 123.  See infra notes 124–30 and accompanying text. 
 124.  See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 125.  See infra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
 126.  ‘244 Patent col.9 ll.45–51 (emphasis added). 
 127.  ‘244 Patent col.2 ll.16–23 (emphasis added). 
 128.  See Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that 
the economic food animal limitation on the preferred embodiment did not narrow the scope of Martek’s term 
“animal”). 
 129.  See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 130.  See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
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D. Statements Referenced As the Present Invention or the Invention Indicate that the 
Claimed Invention Should be No Broader than the Ordinary Meaning of the Claim 
Language. 
The Martek court failed to incorporate, in its analysis, statements indicated as the 
present invention or the invention, which would have supported the notion that 
Martek did not unmistakably intend to assign a meaning, other than the ordinary 
meaning, to the claim term “animal.”131 In Honeywell International, Inc. v. ITT 
Industries, Inc. and in Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., the Federal Circuit 
found that statements designated as the invention limited the claim’s coverage to 
those statements.132 The C.R. Bard court further stated that those statements are 
especially relevant when they are located in sections that typically describe the 
invention as a whole.133 
In this case, the ‘244 Patent’s Field of Invention section, which usually describes 
the invention rather than embodiments, plainly stated that “[t]he present invention 
concerns a method for raising an animal having . . . high concentrations of omega-3 
highly unsaturated fatty acids (HUFA) and food products derived from such 
animals.”134 As Judge Lourie explained, “[f]ood products are not derived from 
humans.”135 However, “food products” are derived from economic food animals 
such as “poultry, cattle, swine and seafood” as indicated in the “Brief Summary of 
the Invention,” which is another section that typically describes the invention in its 
entirety.136 Again, because economic food animals are not nearly as broad as to 
include humans, the Field of Invention statement demonstrated that the “present 
invention” did not stretch beyond the scope of the original meaning of the term 
“animal.”137 
 
 
E. Other Factors Such as Distinctions between Humans and Animals Made in the 
Specification Indicate that Humans Were Not Included in the Claim Term “Animal.” 
The Martek court should have used, rather than ignored, the distinctions that the 
specification made between humans and animals to find that Martek did not clearly 
 
 131.  See generally Martek, 579 F.3d at 1379–83. 
 132.  See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 134.  ‘244 Patent col.1 ll.21–24 (emphasis added). 
 135.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1383 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 136.  ‘244 Patent col.2 ll.19–23. 
 137.  See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
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intend to depart from the customary meaning of the term “animal.”138 In Phillips, 
the court stated that limitations added to other claims made it likely that the 
patentee did not contemplate that the first claim, the text of which the other claims 
adopted, contained those limitations.139 Similarly, there would be no need to 
differentiate humans from animals unless the patentee did not consider humans to 
be included in the category of “animal.”140 
In this case, Martek distinguished humans from animals several times in the 
specification of the ‘244 Patent.141 For example, in one section, Martek described 
how to integrate materials containing omega-3 HUFAs into animal feed.142 
Thereafter, the patent discussed the details in purifying the omega-3 HUFAs to be 
“used as a nutritional supplement for humans, as a food additive, or for 
pharmaceutical applications.”143 Moreover, humans and animals are explicitly 
distinguished later in the specification: “As discussed in detail above, the whole-cell 
biomass can be used directly as a food additive to enhance the omega-3 highly 
unsaturated fatty acid content and nutritional value of processed foods for human 
intake or for animal feed.”144 As the dissent pointed out, if Martek had intended to 
for the term “animal” to include humans, there would be no need to distinguish 
humans from animals throughout the specification.145 Furthermore, the patent 
discussed, in the same paragraph, the treatment of human diseases.146 Again, 
because non-human animals suffer from the same diseases, there would be no 
reason to specify the treatment of humans.147 
Although the majority asserted that the discussion that distinguished humans 
and animals made it clear that Martek intended to include humans in the claim 
term “animal” by acknowledging the applicable of the invention to humans, it was 
an overstatement.148 Typically, applicants do not claim everything in their 
specification because claims that are too broad are rejected by the PTO.149 
Consequently, the specification of a patent may identify that their invention is 
 
 138.  See infra notes 139–47 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 140.  See infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 141.  See infra notes 142–47 and accompanying text. 
 142.  ‘244 Patent cols.5–7 ll.30–7. 
 143.  Id. at col.7 ll.8–11. 
 144.  Id. at col.7 ll.42–45 (emphasis added). 
 145.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1384 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 146.  ‘244 Patent col.7 ll.51–60. 
 147.  Martek, 579 F.3d at 1384. 
 148.  Id. at 1381–82 (majority opinion). 
 149.  See In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that the Patent and Trademark 
Office broadly interprets claims during examination of a patent application so the applicant may amend his 
claims to obtain protection consistent with his actual contribution to the public.) 
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applicable in other ways or to other things; however, in patent law, the patentee 
only has rights to the invention written in the claim section of the specification.150 
F. The Majority’s New Rule Potentially Alters the Legal Scope of Patents Drafted in 
Reliance on the Established Lexicographer Rule. 
During patent examination, the PTO requires that pending claims be given their 
“broadest reasonable interpretation” consistent with the specification.151 Although it 
is understood that the PTO does not interpret patent claims during the examination 
process in the same manner as a court would interpret claims during an 
infringement action, patent applicants have in the past been able to rely on the fact 
that both the PTO and the courts interpret claims in light of the specification as a 
whole.152 
However, the majority’s new rule eliminates this consistency in interpreting 
claims by the PTO in the course of prosecution and by the courts in infringement 
suits where the patent specification includes at least one sentence providing the 
term’s special meaning somewhere in the specification.153 Under the new rule, the 
sentence would govern the term’s definition unless the specification revealed that 
the patentee unmistakably renounced the special meaning.154 On the other hand, the 
established lexicographer rule required the patentee to demonstrate clear intent in 
light of the overall specification in assigning a special meaning to a term before the 
ordinary meaning of the term could be overridden.155 As such, the new rule flips the 
previously established lexicographer rule on its head—requiring instead that the 
 
 150. See supra note 2; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“The written description part of the specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the 
function and purpose of claims.”). 
 151.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The [PTO] determines the scope of 
claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest 
reasonable construction ‘in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the 
art.’”); see also 2111 Claim Interpretation; Broadest Reasonable Interpretation, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2111.htm (last visited Dec. 16. 2010). 
 152.  See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the PTO is not required 
during the patent examination process to interpret claims in applications in the same manner as a court would 
interpret claims in an infringement suit; and explaining that the “PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed 
claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by 
one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise 
that may be afforded by the written description contained in applicant’s specification”); see also 2111 Claim 
Interpretation; Broadest Reasonable Interpretation, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2111.htm (last visited Dec. 16. 2010). 
 153.  See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 154.  Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 155.  See supra Part.II.A. 
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specification must show clear intent to override the special meaning in favor of a 
term’s ordinary meaning.156 
Patents with specifications providing a single sentence broadly describing a claim 
term will most likely be minimally, if at all, affected by the new additional 
inconsistency between claim interpretation in the course of prosecution and claim 
construction in infringement suits.157  However, patents with specifications that 
seemingly supply an example or an embodiment while illustrating the claim term 
may have had their legal scope narrowed.158  To demonstrate the effect that the 
majority’s new rule may have on such patents drafted in reliance of the traditional 
lexicographer rule, the following sentence is provided: 
A “controlled amount” of protic material is an amount up to that which inhibits 
the reaction of aniline with nitrobenzene, e.g., up to about 4% H2O based on the 
volume of the reaction mixture when aniline is utilized as the solvent.159 
Without more, the sentence may illustrate that the definition assigned to a 
“controlled amount” of protic material based on volume when aniline is utilized as 
the solvent is about 4% H20.
160 According to the Federal Circuit in Sinorgchem Co., 
Shandong v. ITC, the sentence demonstrated the patentee’s intent to define 
“controlled amount” as utilized in the patentee’s claim language.161 
Assuming that the specification at issue included the above sentence in an early 
section as well as a detailed chart in a later section, listing the various amounts of 
H20 (e.g., 5, 6, 7, or 8 percent) which could potentially inhibit the reaction of aniline 
with nitrobenzene when aniline is utilized as the solvent, the traditional 
lexicographer rule would not limit the term “controlled amount” to about 4% H20 
when aniline is utilized as the solvent.162 Rather, the established lexicographer rule 
would allow a “controlled amount” of protic material to encompass any amount up 
to that which inhibits the reaction of aniline with nitrobenzene.163 
However, under the majority’s new rule, the above sentence would govern the 
meaning of the term “controlled amount” unless the rest of the specification 
demonstrated that the patentee unmistakably intended to renounce the limited 
definition provided.164 Because the detailed chart does not expressly state that any of 
the various amounts of H20 listed is a “controlled amount,” the heavy burden of the 
 
 156.  See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 157.  The PTO will utilize broad descriptions of a claim term to determine the term’s broadest reasonable 
interpretation. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.   
 158.  See infra notes 159–65 and accompanying text. 
 159.  Sinorgchem Co., Shandong v. ITC, 511 F.3d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 160.  See id.  
 161.  Id. 
 162.  See supra Part II.A. 
 163.  See supra Part II.A. 
 164.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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majority’s new rule to override the meaning supplied by the sentence would most 
likely not be satisfied.165 As such, the broader scope of the claim language—and 
potentially other patents drafted prior to Martek—that would have been granted by 
the time-honored lexicographer rule has been greatly limited by the majority’s new 
rule.166 
V. Conclusion 
In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the term 
“animal” included humans because the patent specification provided a single 
sentence definition that was not unquestionably renounced by the rest of the 
specification.167 In so holding, the Martek court flipped the established lexicographer 
rule on its head, demanding the patentee to provide clear intent in the specification 
override a single sentence definition for a claim term as opposed to requiring the 
patentee to illustrate unambiguous intent to override that term’s plain meaning.168 If 
the majority had applied the established lexicographer rule, the court would have 
found that Martek’s purported definition was not supported by the rest of the 
specification, and thereafter, correctly conclude that Martek did not satisfy its 
burden to overcome the customary meaning of the term “animal,” which did not 
include humans.169 By developing its new rule, the court potentially modified the 
legal scope of patents drafted in reliance on the established lexicographer rule—
either inconsistently broadening or narrowing such scope.170 
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